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THE STATES, THE SCHOOLS AND THE BIBLE: THE EQUAL AccEsS
AcT AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of religion in society has been an ongoing source of
controversy in this country. The controversy is perhaps most appar-
ent, and most intense, when the role of religion in the public
schools is considered! The constitutionality of in-class prayer,
bible readings, moments of silence, and the display of the Ten
Commandments have all been considered by the Supreme Court,
and all were found impermissible.2
I. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Religious Civil Rights in Public High Schools: The
Supreme Court Speaks on Equal Access, 24 IND. L. REV. 111, 111 (1991) (stating that
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens is a civil rights case
which clarifies that religion has a legitimate place in public schools); Douglas Laycock,
Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private
Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (discussing the meaning of neutrality and argu-
ing that the Constitution allows properly implemented moments of silence and requires
equal access for religious speech); Frank R. Jimenez, Note, Beyond Mergens: Ensuring
Equality of Student Religious Speech Under the Equal Access Act, 100 YALE L.J. 2149
(1991) (arguing that reference to curriculum is unnecessary in determining whether the
Equal Access Act applies).
2. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1995) (moments of silence in public schools
impermissible); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (the Ten Command-
ments may not be posted on a public school classroom wall); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible readings in public schools impermissible); Engel v.
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To some, attempts to maintain a separation of church and state
in public schools have been carried to an extreme, resulting in
discrimination and hostility toward religious speech, ideas, and
expression.3 In recent years, several public school officials have
prohibited student-initiated religious speech within the school envi-
ronment.4 While permitting various student-initiated extracurricular
groups to meet in empty classrooms, several schools have denied
the use of school facilities to students wishing to meet to discuss
religious topics. 5 This has occurred notwithstanding the fact that in
1984 Congress overwhelmingly passed the "Equal Access Act," de-
signed precisely to protect high school students from this sort of
exclusion from an otherwise available school forum.6
The debate over equal access is not new. It is but one illustra-
tion of the inevitable conflict between those provisions of the First
Amendment requiring freedom of speech and free exercise of reli-
gion, and that which prohibits governmental establishment of reli-
gion.7 With respect to the 1984 Equal Access Act ("EAA"), it ap-
peared that most of this conflict was resolved in June of 1990
when the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Mergens' held
that the EAA did not violate the Establishment Clause. Within
fifteen months of this decision, however, a new source of conflict
surfaced. In Garnett v. Renton School District,9 a federal district
court in the state of Washington interpreted the language of the
EAA to exempt Washington from the Act's requirements by virtue
of the stricter prohibition on state establishment of religion found
in the Washington State Constitution. ° Thus, states which had
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer in public schools impermissible).
3. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 1, at 111-13 (stating that many public school offi-
cials have tried to suppress religious expression at their schools and that evidence of bias
against religion is clear).
4. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
5. IL
6. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). See also infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Equal Access Act).
7. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See also JOHN
E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITnmoNAL LAW § 17.1 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the "natural
antagonism" between the First Amendment clauses).
8. 496 U.S. 226, (1990). See also infra notes 80-116 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Mergens case).
9. 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
10. IM. See also infra notes 115-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Garnett
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hoped to justify noncompliance with the Act by claiming it violat-
ed the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution, prior to
the decision in Mergens, could now follow Garnett's lead and look
to their state constitutions for an exemption from the Act. Less
than one month later, a federal district court in Idaho reached the
opposite conclusion on virtually identical facts. In Hoppock v. Twin
Falls School District," the Idaho court determined that the Idaho
State Constitution, like that of Washington, prohibited equal access
to religious groups." The court concluded, however, that the fed-
eral law must prevail. 3
This note examines the application of the EAA in light of the
conflict between the Act and state constitutions and argues that
equal access should be granted to religious groups regardless of the
requirements of a state constitution. Section II discusses the back-
ground of the equal access controversy: early court cases regarding
equal access, the enactment of the EAA by Congress, and the 1990
Mergens decision by the Supreme Court. Section III examines the
district court opinions in Garnett and Hoppock, setting out more
specifically the conflict between federal and state law. Section
IV(A) analyzes the students' rights to freedom of speech within the
school environment and concludes that equal access is- not merely
permitted, but required by the Federal Constitution. Section IV(B)
examines the EAA and concludes that the Act works to preempt
contrary state law, and, thus, should prevail over a state constitu-
tion. An amendment to the Act is proposed which would make
congressional intent to preempt absolutely clear, thereby perma-
nently resolving the disagreement regarding application of the EAA
in light of conflicting state law.
H. BACKGROUND
A. Equal Access and the Courts Prior to 1984
The controversy over equal access existed well -before the
EAA was adopted in 1984. One of the most important decisions
considering an equal access policy in the educational context is
Widmar v. Vincent.'4 In Widmar, the plaintiffs were members of a
ease).
11. 772 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Idaho 1991).
12. Id. at 1164.
13. Id.
14. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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religious student group at the University of Missouri at Kansas
City called "Cornerstone". 15 Along with over one hundred other
student groups, Cornerstone was registered with the University and
met regularly on the campus. 16 In 1977, however, the University
informed Cornerstone that it would no longer be permitted to use
the school's facilities for its meetings." This decision was based
on a University policy which prohibited the use of its buildings
"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching." 8 The
regulation explicitly stated that the policy was "required . . . by the
Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other
construction."' 9 The district court upheld the regulation, conclud-
ing that it was not only permissible but required by the Establish-
ment Clause of the Federal Constitution.2" The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding no compelling justification
for the University's content-based restriction on religious speech.2'
The Supreme Court affirmed.'
The Supreme Court specifically stated that its conclusion was
not based on the students' rights under the Free Exercise Clause,
but on their First Amendment rights of free speech and associa-
tion.23 The Court noted that the religious worship and discussion
in which the student group wished to engage constituted "forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment." 24
Thus, in order to justify its policy, the University would have to
demonstrate that the regulation served a compelling state interest
and was narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' The University as-
serted that the regulation served to maintain the strict separation of
church and state required under the Establishment Clauses of both
the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 26
15. Id. at 265.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 265 n.3.
20. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th
Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
22. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
23. Id. at 273 n.13.
24. Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id. at 270-71. The federal Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The-Missou-
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First the Court considered whether the Federal Constitution
required the University to regulate access to school facilities. While
agreeing with the University that compliance with constitutional
obligations was a compelling interest,27 the Court determined that
an equal access policy would not violate the Federal Establishment
Clause according to the three-prong test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.25 The Lemon test states that a regulation does not vio-
late the Establishment Clause if (1) it serves a secular legislative
purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.29 The Widmar Court quickly disposed
of the first and third prongs of the test, noting that both the district
and appellate courts found that these prongs were satisfied."0 With
respect to the second prong, the Court concluded that a nondis-
criminatory policy toward the religious group's speech would bene-
fit religion only incidentally, if at all, and, therefore, such a policy
did not violate the Establishment Clause.31
The University claimed, however, that it had a compelling
interest in complying with the stricter requirements of separation of
church and state found in the Missouri Constitution, which would
be violated by allowing the student groups to meet in the
University's buildings.32 The Court rejected this contention, stating
that "the state interest ... in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the ... Federal
Constitution ... [is not] sufficiently 'compelling' to justify con-
ri Constitution is much more explicit in its provisions requiring separation of church and
state, stating in part "[t]hat no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, direct-
ly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion . . . and that no
preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or
creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship." Mo. CONST. of 1945, art. I,
§7.
27. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. Id. at 612-13.
30. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72. The lower courts found that a secular purpose was
served by providing the students with a forum in which they could exchange ideas, and
that ,"the University does not . . . endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired"
in the forum merely by creating the forum. Id. at 271-72 n.10. The courts determined that
the "excessive entanglement" test was also met. The University actually risked greater en-
tanglement with religion by excluding such speech, since the regulation required constant
monitoring of group meetings to ensure that no religous speech took place. Id. at 272
n.hl.
31. Id. at 274.
32. Id. at 275.
10251993]
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tent-based discrimination, against [the students'] religious
speech."
33
Following Widmar, several courts considered the equal -access
issue with respect to students of less than college age. The con-
fusion of these courts regarding the applicability of the Widmar
decision to high school students is evidenced by their conflicting
holdings. In Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District34 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the holding of voluntary religious meetings on school
grounds before or after school hours violated the Establishment
Clause.35 Nartowicz v. Clayton County School District36 upheld a
district court order granting a preliminary injunction which prohib-
ited meetings of a "Youth for Christ" group after school hours at a
junior high school.37 In Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dis-
trict,3" however, the district court determined that permitting a
student-initiated prayer club to meet during the regularly scheduled
activity period did not violate the Establishment Clause, but, in
fact, was required by the Free Speech Clause.3 9 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit," in a decision subsequently vacated
by the Supreme Court on standing grounds,4' reversed the district
court, concluding that the group's meetings would be impermissi-
ble.42 In Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District,43 the Dis-
33. Id. at 276.
34. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
35. Id. at 1048. The court attempted to distinguish Widinar on the grounds that the
Lubbock School District had not created a public forum, stating that "[tihe holding of
student meetings at a public school does not turn that school into a public forum." Id.
This "distinction" is rather peculiar since Widmar involved a state, not a private univer-
sity.
36. 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984).
37. Id. at 649.
38. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated,
475 U.S. 534 (1986).
39. Id. at 716.
40. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475
U.S. 534 (1986).
41. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (vacating the decision
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals based on conclusion that appellant lacked standing
to appeal).
42. Bender, 741 F.2d at 541. The court acknowledged that the students' free speech
rights were implicated. Id. at 550. The court, however, balanced these rights against Es-
tablishment Clause concerns, which it also felt were implicated, finding that the constitu-
tional interest in avoiding establishment of religion outweighed the "interest in protecting
free speech within the context of the activity period." Id. at 559.
43. No. Civ-81-620-T (W.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 1983), afd in part and rev'd in part,
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trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that student-
initiated prayer meetings were constitutionally permissible after
school, but impermissible before school. 44 This decision was re-
versed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that
such meetings would violate the Establishment Clause.45 These
decisions obviously gave little guidance to anyone attempting to
discern precisely what schools were required to, permitted to, or
prohibited from doing with respect to equal access.
B. The Legislative Solution: The Equal Access Act
The effect of these conflicting court decisions concerned many
in Congress. The decisions caused a great deal of confusion among
school officials, who reacted by engaging in policies hostile toward
religion in an attempt to avoid costly litigation against claims of
establishment of religion.' For example, some high school stu-
dents were prohibited from including religion-related items in the
school newspapers.47 A student in Minnesota was told to remove
a button which the principal understood to convey a religious mes-
sage.48 Students in Boulder, Colorado were instructed that they
could not sit together in groups of two or more for the purpose of
religious discussion.49 While permitting research papers on topics
such as ethics and the occult, some teachers prohibited or even
ridiculed papers on religious topics. 50 A fourth grade student in
Minnesota was reprimanded for bowing her head in prayer before a
766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
44. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2349, 2353 (discussing the district court opinion in Bell).
45. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1402-07 (10th Cir. 1985).
46. See, e.g., 130 CoNG. REC. S6651 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) ("schools have
been coerced into [cancelling voluntary student meetings which have a religious content]
by the threat of costly lawsuits"); id. at H3859-60 (statement of Rep. Coats) ("[the EAA]
is needed because local school authorities wishing to avoid legal controversy have dramat-
ically restricted first amendment rights of students"); H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1984) (discussing confusion of school officials due to lower federal court deci-
sions); S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 12-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2358-61; Robert L. Crewdson, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and the
Free Speech Limits of the Establishment Clause in Public High Schools, 16 I.L. & EDuc.
167, 167 (1987) (citing examples of the ways in which "[s]chool attorneys and adminis-
trators, under pressure from interest groups wielding new theories of how schools might
violate the Establishment Clause, have gone to absurd lengths to avoid lawsuits").
47. S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2362.
48. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2363 (the button read "How's Your
Love Life?").
49. Id.
50. Id.
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meal.51 These incidents conveyed to students a message of state
hostility, rather than neutrality, toward religion.52 Finding this
message unacceptable,53 Congress took action.
The earliest bill to provide for equal access to student reli-
gious groups during non-instructional periods was introduced in
September of 1982 by republican Senator Mark Hatfield, an oppo-
nent of school-endorsed prayer.' Senator Hatfield's bill never
made it to the floor for a vote, but the following year Senator
Jeremiah Denton introduced S.1059, an equal access measure simi-
lar to Hatfield's version.55 The legislation was voted favorably out
of the Senate .Judiciary Committee, of which Senator Denton was a
member, by a vote of twelve to four in September of 1983.56 The
following April, the House version of the Equal Access Act, H.R.
5345, introduced by Representative Don Bonker, Chairman Carl
Perkins of the Hoftse Committee on Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative William Goodling, and Representative Rodney Chandler
was voted favorably out of the committee by a vote of thirty to
three.57 After several revisions, the bill passed in the Senate on
June 27, 1984, by a vote of 88 to 11, and in the House on July
25, by a vote of 337 to 77.58 On August 11, President Reagan
signed the Equal Access Act into law.59
The Act was seen as an attempt to resolve the confusion
among school administrators created by the conflicting lower court
decisions.'. The drafters and supporters of the bill felt that the
51. Id. at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2364.
52. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2365 (discussing student perception of
state hostility toward religion).
53. See, e.g., id. at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2367 ("If local authorities
could take a truly neutral stance toward religious speech, students would lose the tragic
perception that the government is affirmatively hostile to religious expression, a perception
that could, in the next generation, lead to the national disaster of intolerance of reli-
gion.").
54. RODNEY K. SMrrH, PUBIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 280 (1987). See also
Crewdson, supra note 46, at 170 (discussing the introduction of Senator Hatfield's bill).
55. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 280 (discussing the introduction of Senator Hatfield's
bill).
56. See S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2351 (discussing the disposition of Senator Hatfield's bill by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee).
57. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 280-81 (discussing the disposition of the House of
Representatives' version of the Equal Access Act).
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 3 (discussing the confusion of
school administrators resulting from the lower court decisions); S. REP. NO. 357, supra
1028 [Vol. 43:1021
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denial of equal access to religious groups violated the students'
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of speech, free exercise
of religion, and free association." Many of the proponents felt
that the reasoning of Widmar was fully applicable to high school
students' religious speech and saw the Act as an expedient way to
cut through the conflicts in the lower courts. 62 The purpose of the
Act as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee was to "clarify
and confirm the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and free exercise of religion which accrue
to public school students who desire voluntarily to exercise those
rights" when the school creates a forum for extracurricular activi-
ties.63
The substantive requirements of the Act are fairly straight-
forward: when a school allows noncurriculum student groups to
meet, it may not deny a group the right to meet based on the
content of the group's speech.' The Act's requirements are trig-
gered when a school receives federal funds and has established a
"limited open forum." 6  Such a forum exists when a school al-
lows "one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet
on school premises during noninstructional time." 66 The Act pro-
vides that such meetings must be "voluntary and student initiat-
note 44, at 13-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2359-60 (providing examples which
demonstrate the confusion among school administrators).
61. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 6 (stating that Congress should
pass equal access legislation in order to fulfill "its duty to uphold the Constitution in
dealing with the issue of religious speech in public secondary schools"); S. REP. No. 357,
supra note 44, at 12, 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2358, 2360 (concluding that
students are being denied the rights of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion
which should be fully protected by the First Amendment); 130 CONG. REC. S8337 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("[W]here there is an action . . . taken by [school officials]
which denies a right that is guaranteed under the Constitution, then the Congress of the
United States, I think, has a duty and an obligation to step in and remedy that violated
right."); id. at H3856 (statement of Rep. Perkins) ("This . . . bill guarantees first amend-
ment rights to the free exercise of religion and to freedom of speech for students in
public high schools . . ").
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 3 ("Despite Widinar, many school
administrators across the country are prohibiting voluntary, student-initiated religious speech
at the secondary school level."); S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 6-10, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2352-56 (discussing Widmar and the belief that its reasoning should
apply to students below the college level); 130 CONG. REc. H3856 (1984) (statement of
Rep. Perkins) ("We are only trying to get [WPidmar] to apply to high school students
because of so many contradictory lower Federal court decisions . . . .").
63. S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2349.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988).
65. Id § 4071(a).
66. Id § 4071(b).
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ed,"67 that there can be no school sponsorship of or participation
in the meetings by school employees, 68 and that the meeting may
not interfere with the orderly conduct of the school.69 Subsection
(d) places specific limitations on government control over meetings,
providing that nothing in the Act
shall be construed to authorize the United States or any
State or political subdivision thereof -
(1) to influence the form or content of any prayer or
other religious activity;
(2) to require any person to participate in prayer or
other religious activity;
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
... or
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any per-
son.
70
Several provisions in the final version of the Act represented
compromises designed to allay objections which had been raised
during debates in both houses. For example, as originally intro-
duced in the Senate, S.1059 did not limit the equal access require-
ment to secondary schools, but included all public schools receiv-
ing federal funds.71 This concerned some members of Congress
who felt that young children were too impressionable to discern the
distinction between government support of and neutrality toward
religion.72 Much of this opposition was satisfied when the Act's
application was limited to secondary schools.73
A source of strong opposition to the House version was found
67. Id § 4071(c)(1).
68. Id § 4071(c)(2)-(3).
69. Id § 4071(c)(4).
70. Id § 4071(d).
71. See S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2349.
72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 710, supra note 46, at 15 (dissenting views of Rep.
Ackerman, Rep. Burton, Rep. Ford and Rep. Simon) (discussing the impressionability of
college students versus younger students); S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 43, reprint-
ed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2389 (minority view of Sen. Mathias) (discussing the fact
that young children cannot make the distinction between government support of and neu-
trality towards religion); id. at 48, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2394 (minority view
of Sen. Metzenbaum) (discussing the impressionability of high school students versus
younger students).
73. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 282.
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in the nature of the sanction for violations of the Act. Section 2 of
H.R. 5345 provided that violations would be met with a denial of
federal funds.' The House dissenters noted that the entire school
district may be subject to the cut-off of funds even though only
one school denied equal access. 5 As finally adopted, the EAA
specifically disavowed the denial of federal funds as a sanction for
violations of the Act.7 6 Other compromises and revisions included
provisions to protect the rights of nontraditional religious groups by
requiring that no minimum size be established,77 and to limit the
participation or influence of individuals not affiliated with the
school.78 The final result was an unusually bipartisan effort to
protect the First Amendment -rights of students in the public
schools. 9
C. Mergens: The Supreme Court Speaks on the EAA
In 1990, the Supreme Court spoke for the first time on the
merits of the EAA. ° Board of Education v. Mergens8t presented
the claim of several high school students seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the school board which refused to allow
the students to form a Christian club.82 Although approximately
thirty student groups met at the school on a voluntary basis, the
students interested in forming the religious club were informed that
such an organization would violate the Establishment Clause. 3
74. See H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 9.
75. Id. at 16.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(e) (1988).
77. Id § 4071(d)(6). See also SMITH, supra note 54, at 284-85 (stating that there is
no minimum size requirement in order for the EAA to be applicable).
78. § 4071(c)(5) (stating that "nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or
regularly attend activities of student groups"). See also SMrTs, supra note 54, at 285
(discussing the fact that schools can prevent persons not affiliated with the school from
influencing or conducting school groups).
79. See D. Jarrett Arp, Note, Beyond Mergens: Balancing a Student's Free Speech
Right Against the Establishment Clause in Public High School Equal Access Cases, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 139 (1990) (arguing' that the impressionability rationale
should be abandoned and proposing an evidentiary test that allows for balancing free
speech rights against the Establishment Clause).
80. The only EAA case to reach the Supreme Court prior to Mergens was Bender v.
Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). The Court in that case vacated
the decision of the Court of Appeals based on the conclusion that the petitioner, a mem-
ber of the school board, did not have standing to appeal the decision of the district court.
Id. at 536:
81. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id. at 232-33. The students wished to meet on the same conditions as the other
103119931
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The students argued that the school's refusal to allow the group to
meet violated the EAA, and additionally, denied them their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech, association, and the free exer-
cise of religion."' The school responded by arguing that it was
not bound by the terms of the EAA; it did not have the "limited
open forum" which triggers the requirements of the Act since all
of the clubs meeting at the school were curriculum-related.8 5 Fur-
thermore, the school argued that even if it did fall within the terms
of the Act, it nevertheless could deny the Christian club permission
to meet because the EAA itself violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.86
The district court agreed with the school's contention that it
did not have a "limited open forum," and, thus, the Act did not
apply." It also found no merit in the students' constitutional
claim.88 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
concluding that several of the clubs at the school were in fact
noncurriculum-related, thus triggering the requirements of the
EAA. 9 The appellate court also rejected the school's contention
that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. 90
The Supreme Court affirmed.91 First, the Court considered the
categorization of various student groups as either curriculum or
noncurriculum-related. It found neither the language of the Act nor
the legislative history to be helpful in defining the term
"noncurriculum related student group."' In light of the Act's
student groups, with the exception that they would not have a faculty sponsor. The school
officials informed the students that school policy required that all student clubs have a
faculty sponsor. Id.
84. Id. at 233.
85. Id. at 237-43 (discussing the meaning of curriculum-related versus noncurriculum-
related activities). Of the thirty clubs meeting at the school, the parties disputed the char-
acterization of ten groups as curriculum-related: Interact (a service club); Chess; Subsurfers
(for students interested in scuba diving); National Honor Society; Photography; Welcome
to Westside; Future Business Leaders of America; Zonta (the female counterpart to Inter-
act); Student Advisory Board and Student Forum (both student government organizations).
Id. at 243-44.
86. Id. at 247.
87. Id. at 233.
88. Id. (reasoning that the school did not have the limited public forum found in
Widmar).
89. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 496 U.S.
226 (1990).
90. Id. at 1080.
91. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
92. Id. at 237.
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"broad legislative purpose to address perceived widespread
discrimination against religious speech in public schools," however,
the Court determined that the term "noncurriculum related student
group" should be "interpreted broadly to mean any student group
that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the
school." 93 Applying this definition, it was "clear that Westside's
existing student groups include[d] one or more 'noncurriculum
related student groups.'"'
Next, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the EAA un-
der the Establishment Clause.95 Six justices agreed that compli-
ance with the EAA did not violate the Establishment Clause.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun joined in
Justice O'Connor's opinion regarding the Establishment Clause
issue.97 The plurality concluded that the reasoning of Widmar v.
Vincent,98 which found an equal access policy in a state university
constitutional under the Lemon test,99 could be applied with equal
force to the EAA.1° The plurality found that the Act had the
secular purpose of "prevent[ing] discrimination against religious and
other types of speech" 101 thereby satisfying the first prong of the
Lemon test. The second prong of the test asks whether the primary
effect of the law is to advance or inhibit religion."° The concern
addressed by this inquiry is whether the law will create the imper-
missible perception of government endorsement of religion.0 3
The plurality held that compliance with the EAA would not create
such a perception. It concluded that "secondary school students are
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not
endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a non-
93. Id. at 239.
94. Id. at 245 (finding that by the school's own descriptions of the groups, at the very
least, Subsurfers and the Chess club were noncurriculum related).
95. Id. at 253, 258 (plurality opinion stating that the EAA does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause).
96. The six justices who agreed that the EAA did not violate the Establishment Clause
were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White, Blackmun, Kennedy and
Scalia.
97. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 229, 247-53 (opinion by Justice O'Connor rejecting
petitioners' claim that the EAA violates the Establishment Clause).
98. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
99. IM at 270-75. See also supra notes 14-33 and accompanying text.
100. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
101. Id. at 249.
102. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
103. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249-50.
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discriminatory basis." 4 The plurality distinguished between "gov-
ernment speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.""0 5 The third prong of
the test asks whether the law creates a risk of excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."4 The plurality found that the
EAA did not."° Although the Act permits the assignment of a
monitor to the meeting "for custodial purposes"," it specifically
prohibits participation in the meeting by any such faculty monitor
or any sort of school sponsorship of the meeting."'° Furthermore,
the plurality was persuaded by the reasoning of Widmar that a
prohibition on religious speech at school meetings may create a
more excessive government entanglement because the school would
have to constantly monitor all student meetings to ensure that reli-
gious speech was not taking place."'
In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, Justices Kennedy and Scalia agreed that the EAA did not
violate the requirements of the Establishment Clause."' The con-
curring opinion, however, did not apply the Lemon test, but instead
used the two-part test set forth by Justice Kennedy in his concur-
ring opinion in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union."' Under the Allegheny test, a law is consistent with the
requirements of the Establishment Clause if it does not result in
government coercion to participate in a religious activity or does
not directly benefit religion such that it in fact establishes or tends
to establish a state religion or religious faith. 3 The concurring
Justices found the Act valid since there was nothing to indicate
that enforcement of the statute would result in the coercion of
students to participate in religious activity, and any benefits con-
ferred on a religious group under the Act would be incidental.
1 4
104. Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
107. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253.
108. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (1988).
109. L § 4071(c)(2)-(3).
110. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11
(1981) (agreeing with the court of appeals that prohibiting religious speech at school
meetings might create more entanglement).
111. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 260.
112. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
113. Id. at 659.
114. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261-62.
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In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan concluded that "the Act as applied to Westside
could withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny .... 1 5 Justice
Marshall, however, found it necessary to write separately to empha-
size the necessity of the school's taking special efforts to fully
disassociate itself from the club's religious speech to avoid any
possible appearance of sponsorship or endorsement of the group's
goals." 6
III. ISSUE
The Supreme Court's decision in Mergens by no means settled
the equal access controversy. Although Mergens put to rest the
question of the EAA's constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause of the Federal Constitution, a new question has emerged:
does the EAA apply to public schools where the state constitution,
standing alone, clearly would prohibit equal access because it con-
tains stricter prohibitions on the establishment of religion than does
the Federal Constitution? Two recent federal district courts consid-
ering this issue have reached different conclusions.
A. Garnett v. Renton School District..7
Lindbergh High School, located in the Renton School District
in the state of Washington, allowed student groups to meet in
classrooms during noninstructional time. In 1987, Riciard Garnett
and other students asked school authorities for permission to use a
classroom for meetings of a non-denominational Christian student
group prior to morning classes." 8 The request was denied be-
cause the club was noncurriculum related," 9 and, therefore,
school authorities believed that allowing such meetings would
115. Id. at 263.
116. Id. at 263, 267-68. Justice Marshall found Widmar distinguishable because the
University of Missouri specifically disavowed any endorsement of the opinions of any
student organization meeting on the campus. Id. at 267. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 274 n.14 (1981) (discussing student handbook which stated that the University was
not identified with the student organizations). In contrast, Westside "explicitly promote[d]
its student clubs 'as a vital part 6f the total education program [and] as a means of de-
veloping citizenship.'" Mergens, 496 U.S. at 267.
117. 874 F. 2d. 608 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 496 U.S. 914 (1990), on remand, 772 F.
Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
118. Id at 609.
119. The school's stated policy was that only curriculum related student groups would
be permitted to meet. The policy specifically stated that the district "does not offer a
limited open forum." Id. (quoting Renton School District Policy 6470).
10351993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
violate the Establishment Clause.' The students brought suit in
United States District Court seeking a preliminary injunction requir-
ing the school district to allow them to use the classroom. The
district court denied the injunction and entered judgment in favor
of the school district.1
2
'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' The
appellate court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
EAA was not applicable. The school did not permit any
noncurriculum related student groups to meet and, thus, did not
provide the limited open forum required to trigger the Act's re-
quirements."z Applying the Lemon test, the appellate court found
that to allow the student group to meet would violate the Establish-
ment Clause. 2 4 While conceding that there was arguably a secu-
lar purpose for permitting the religious group to meet in the
school, the court concluded that such action would have the prima-
ry effect of advancing religion and would cause excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. ' 5  The court distinguished
Widmar v. Vincent based on the fact that "[h]igh school students
are less mature and more impressionable than university stu-
dents."'26 The students petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari.
On June 11, 1990, just one week after deciding Mergens,'27
the Supreme Court summarily granted the students' petition for a
writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the court
of appeals "for further consideration in light of [the Mergens deci-
sion].' 28 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently re-
manded the case to the District Court for the Western District of
120. Id. at 610.
121. Garnett v. Renton Scb. Dist., 675 F. Supp 1268, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aft'd,
874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 496 U.S. 914 (1990), on remand, 772 F. Supp.
531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
122. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 614.
123. Id
124. Id. at 610-12 (allowing requested meeting of student religious group violates all
three prongs of the Lemon test).
125. Id. at 610. The court concluded that "[p]ermitting [the group] to meet . . . would
impermissibly advance rather than neutrally accommodate religion." Id. at 611. Further-
more, excessive entanglement would result since the group would be required to have
faculty supervision, and such supervision "could lead to teacher interference with or advo-
cacy of religious activities." Id. at 612.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text (discussing the Mergens decision).
128. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 496 U.S. 914 (1990), on remand, 772 F. Supp. 531
(W.D. Wash. 1991).
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Washington, 9 the very court which had originally ruled on the
merits of the case four years earlier. On August 15, 1991, United
States District Court Judge Walter McGovern, who had handed
down the initial decision, once again decided that the religious club
could not meet in the school on the same terms as the other stu-
dent groups.' 3"
Judge McGovern acknowledged that, under the criteria set forth
by Mergens, the school had in fact created a "limited open forum"
under the meaning of the EAA."3' Nevertheless, he found the Act
inapplicable because "[t]he Washington constitution ... precludes
the Act from requiring the use of school premises by a religious
club [and t]he Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
does not bar the Washington constitution from limiting application
of the Act."1
32
I Having determined that the EAA was triggered by the school's
creation of a limited open forum, the court then discussed the
nonestablishment provisions of the Washington Constitution. First,
Article I, Section 11, which addresses religious freedom, states in
part that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment."' 33 Second, Article IX,
Section 4, which deals with sectarian control of schools, provides
that "[a]ll schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influ-
ence."' "M The court found that, although the EAA did not violate
the federal Establishment Clause,1 35 "[t]he Washington Constitu-
tion 'require[d] a far stricter separation of church and state than the
federal constitution.' 1 36 No "de minimis" violation of these pro-
visions may be tolerated; the prohibition on religious influence or
support of schools in Washington is absolute. 137 Additionally, the
use of public school property for the meetings, the use of school
129. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531, 532 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
130. Id. at 538.
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 532-33.
133. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
134. Id art. IX, § 4.
135. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (holding that the EAA
does not violate the Establishment Clause). See also supra part H.C (discussing the
Mergens decision).
136. Garnen, 772 F. Supp. at 535 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 536.
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personnel to supervise the meetings, and the use of bulletin boards
or other common areas to advertise the club "are all uses of public
personnel or public funds to support religion."1 38  Judge
McGovern concluded that even if the benefit to the religious group
could only be characterized as "slight," the Washington Constitu-
tion would, nonetheless, be violated.1 39 Having found that the
Washington Constitution would be violated by adhering to the
mandates of the EAA, Judge McGovern held that the Act, by its
own terms, did not apply to the Washington schools."' In sup-
port of this conclusion, Judge McGovern looked to two specific
clauses of the Act which provide that the Act should not be con-
strued to authorize any school district "to sanction meetings that
are otherwise unlawful . . . [or] to abridge the constitutional rights
of any person."' 4' Thus, it was reasoned, since the Washington
Constitution does not permit such meetings, the EAA itself exempt-
ed the state of Washington from the Act's requirements. 42
Next, the court considered whether the Supremacy Clause of
the Federal Constitution 143 nevertheless barred the Washington
Constitution from limiting application of the Federal Act. Judge
McGovern concluded that it did not.144 First, he noted that "state
courts may interpret state constitutions to be more protective of
individual rights than the Federal Constitution." 45 Next, he con-
sidered under what circumstances Congress may be found to have
preempted state law. Quoting from Northwest Central Pipeline
Corp. v. Kansas Corp. Commission,14 Judge McGovern stated:
138. Id. (quoting amicus curiae memorandum of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith).
139. Id. at 537.
140. Id.
141. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (d)(5), (7) (1988).
142. Garnett, 772 F. Supp. at 535.
143. The Supremacy Clause states that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
144. Garnett, 772 F. Supp. at 537.
145. Id. (citations omitted). The opinion does not explain how its interpretation of the
Washington State Constitution is more protective of individual rights than the Federal
Constitution. Presumably, this interpretation of the state constitution shows more deference
to Establishment Clause concerns than does the interpretation of the Federal Establishment
Clause in Mergens. It fails, however, to address any possible concern for individual rights
to freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution which, at least arguably, are greatly infringed by this preference for
establishment concerns.
146. 489 U.S. 493, 526 (1989) (holding that Congress did not utilize its power under
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Congress has the power under the Supremacy Clause...
to pre-empt state law. Determining whether it has exercised
this power requires that we examine congressional intent.
In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an
intent to pre-empt, we infer such intent where Congress has
legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of
regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement
federal law ... or where the state law at issue conflicts
with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply
with both... or because the state law stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional
objectives .... "
Judge McGovern concluded that the EAA does not pre-empt state
law because there was neither explicit nor inferable congressional
intent to do so.'4" Nowhere does the Act explicitly state that it is
to supersede contrary state law, but only that it supersedes all
inconsistent federal law."' Furthermore, referring to the "other-
wise unlawful" or "constitutional rights" clauses,"5  Judge
McGovern read the plain language of the Act to indicate that
"Congress did not legislate so comprehensively as to occupy an
entire field of regulation."' Thus, Judge McGovern concluded,
"[t]here is no intent to displace the Washington Constitution." 52
B. Hoppock v. Twin Falls School District'"
Less than one month after the Garnett decision, a case virtually
identical on its facts was decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho. Hoppock v. Twin Falls School
District concerned the denial of the request of several ninth grade
students attending Robert Stuart Junior High School in Idaho to
form a Christian religious club which was to meet at the school
during noninstructional time. 154 The parties stipulated that the
the Supremacy Clause to preempt the state regulation and that such regulation was consti-
tutional).
147. Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
148. Garnen, 772 F. Supp. at 537.
149. 20 U.S.C. § 4074 (1988).
150. Id. § 4071(d)(5), (7).
151. Garnett, 772 F. Supp. at 537.
152. Id. at 538.
153. 772 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Idaho 1991).
154. Id. at 1161.
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school district maintained a "limited open forum" within the mean-
ing of the EAA and received federal funds. 55 The school district,
however, argued that the Idaho Constitution's requirement of a
strict separation .between church and state prevented it from com-
plying with the provisions of the EAA. Thus, "[t]he only issue
[was] whether the Idaho Constitution [took] precedence over the
EAA and prohibit[ed] religious clubs from meeting on school
property."1
5 6
Although the opinion rebuked Congress for its "encroachment"
into state sovereignty and opined that Congress acted "on the
edge" of its boundaries in passing the EAA, 17 the court conclud-
ed that the federal law must prevail over the conflicting state con-
stitution. 58 The relevant portions of the Idaho Constitution are
similar to those at issue in Garnett.'59 Article 9, Section 6 of the
Idaho State Constitution provides that "[n]o sectarian or religious
tenets or doctrines shall ever be taught in the public schools ....
No books, papers, tracts or documents of a political, sectarian or
denominational character shall be used or introduced in any
schools . . . . ""' Article 9, Section 5 states "[no] school dis-
trict . .. shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any pub-
lic fund or moneys whatever, anything ... for any sectarian or
religious purpose, . . . nor shall any grant or donation of land,
money or other personal property ever be made by the state . . . to
any church or for any sectarian or religious purpose." 16' These
clauses had been interpreted by the state supreme court as requiring
a greater separation of church and state than that which is found in
the Federal Constitution's Establishment Clause.' 62
The court looked to the Supremacy Clause to determine wheth-
er the federal or state law should prevail. 63 Because "the Su-
premacy Clause makes clear [that] the laws of Congress which are
made 'in pursuance' of the Constitution will prevail whenever there
is a direct conflict with the constitutional law of a state," " the
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1164.
158. Id.
159. See supra part IMI.A (discussing the Garnet v. Renton School District decision).
160. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 6.
161. Id. art. IX, § 5.
162. Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 865 (Idaho 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
163. See supra note 143 (quoting Supremacy Clause).
164. Hoppock v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist. No. 411, 772 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (D. Idaho
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initial inquiry was "whether the EAA was passed 'in pursuance' of
the Constitution." 65 Mergens answered this question affirmatively
with respect to the federal Establishment Clause."6 After an ex-
amination of state sovereignty concerns, the Hoppock court con-
cluded that, although state sovereignty is challenged by the EAA,
the Act is nevertheless consistent with the Federal Constitution. 67
Thus, the power of the state constitution to override conflicting
federal law is limited:
Mhe states are free to use their own constitutions to re-
strict or prohibit activity that the federal constitution per-
mits. But when federal law mandates rather than simply
permits certain activity, and that congressional mandate
does not violate any of the limitations on congressional
power... the Supremacy Clause takes over and prohibits
the states from using their own constitution to block the
federal law. "
Accordingly, the court granted the students' request for declaratory
judgment. The school district's refusal to allow the religious group
to meet violated the EAA since "the Supremacy Clause provides
that the Idaho Constitution cannot be used to block operation of
the EAA."
169
IV. ARGumENT
A. Federal Constitutional Requirements
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that equal access be given to student religious speech, even if
prohibited by the state constitution, because free speech rights are
implicated. Thus, the EAA merely codifies a constitutional impera-
tive. Once a school opens its facilities to extracurricular student
groups, denial of access to a group wishing to meet for a religious
purpose violates not only the EAA,"7° but also the First Amend-
1991).
165. Id.
166. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
167. Hoppock, 772 F. Supp. at 1163.
168. Id. at 1164.
169. Id. The court also granted the plaintiffs an injunction to enjoin the school district
from interfering with the students' rights to form the club. Id.
170. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
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ment of the Constitution,17 ' as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" Therefore, a state constitution cannot
exempt a state from the requirement of equal access.
In Mergens the Supreme Court explicitly declined to consider
students' claims that their free speech and free exercise rights had
been abridged. 73 Six members of the Court, however, determined
that compliance with the EAA's requirement of equal access did
not violate the Establishment Clause.Y Two other justices con-
cluded that equal access did not necessarily violate the Establish-
ment Clause as long as proper precautions were taken. 171 Yet,
Mergens only established that equal access is constitutionally per-
mitted, not that it is required. If equal access is only constitutional-
ly permissible, a state may choose not to grant such access (ignor-
ing for the moment the existence of the EAA). A close examina-
tion of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in the
educational context, however, reveals that the drafters of the EAA
were correct in their belief that the mandates of the Act are coex-
tensive with the Constitution.1 76
1. Constitutional Protections Afforded Student Speech
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
171. See supra note 7.
172. All of the provisions of the First Amendement have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947) (estab-
lishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise clause);
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (freedom of peaceable assembly and right
to petition clauses); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (free press clause);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (free speech clause).
173. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
174. Id. at 248, 253, (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Blackmun, JJ.,) (applying the Lemon test); id. at 260 (Kennedy and Scalia, JI., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying the Allegheny test). See also supra part
II.C (discussing in detail the Lemon and Allegheny tests and their application in Mergens).
175. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 262-63 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment) (concluding that equal access in the high school context does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause provided that schools take steps to disassociate themselves from the reli-
gious speech).
176. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. This section of the note argues that
equal access to student religious groups is required by the United States Constitution,
regardless of the existence of the EAA. However, it is assumed that whenever a religious
group seeks access to a school's forum, all the requirements of the EAA are met with
respect to the nature of the group and the forum: the group is student initiated; the meet-
ings are voluntary; the school neither sponsors nor endorses the group; and the school
permits other noncurriculum related student groups to meet. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1988).
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trict1" is an early case that discussed the First Amendment rights
of high school students. The students in Tinker claimed that their
First Amendment rights were violated by a school policy which
prohibited students from wearing black armbands on school premis-
es to protest the war in Vietnam.17 The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of constitu-
tionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled
to freedom of expression of their views." 17
9
The Court declared that the speech of high school students is
constitutionally protected, stating that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."'80 The Court recognized that school officials
need to maintain order and discipline, acknowledging "the com-
prehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent
with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools."'' Thus, student conduct which "materi-
ally disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others" would not be entitled to constitutional
protection. 182 The Court noted, however, that there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the students had created or would
create a disturbance by wearing arnbands"' 3 The Court refused
to permit the school to limit the students' free speech rights based
on an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance."'
The Court acknowledged the risk that "[a]ny word spoken, in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views
of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance,"
but declared that "our Constitution says we must take this
risk."' 8
5
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v.
Pico'86 is a more recent case that affirms the First Amendment
rights of students. In Pico, the students brought suit against the
school board for removing from junior high and high school librar-
177. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
178. Id. at 504-05.
179. Id. at 511.
180. Id. at 506.
181. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 513.
183. Id. at 514.
184. Id. at 508.
185. Id.
186. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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ies several books which the board said contained inappropriate ma-
terial." 7 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted summary judgment in favor of the school board,' but
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remand-
ed.'89 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, con-
cluding that further evidentiary findings regarding disputed factual
issues needed to be made. 9'
As in Tinker, three justices in Pico acknowledged that local
school authorities have broad discretion regarding the daily opera-
tions of their schools.' 9' Four Justices, however, agreed with the
Tinker Court's admonition that such discretion "must be exercised
in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the
First Amendment."' 92  The right of constitutionally protected
speech extends to students both in the right of the speaker to trans-
mit ideas and in the right of the listener to receive them. 93 Al-
though the First Amendment rights of students "must be construed
'in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment,"" 94 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens concluded that
the purposes and functions of the school library made it particular-
ly appropriate to protect the students' First Amendment rights. 9
The three Justices noted that a library is a place for students
"'to test or expand upon ideas presented to [them], in or out of the
classroom. '""96 Therefore, since use of the library by the students
187. Id. at 857-59. The board found the books to be "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Semitic, and just plain filthy."
188. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d
404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
189. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 419 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
190. Pico v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982). The plurality opinion was
authored by Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens in whole
and Justice Blackmun in part. Id. at 855. Justice Blackmun wrote separately, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, because he had "a somewhat different perspective on
the nature of the First Amendment right involved." Id. at 876. Justice White concurred
only in the judgment, refusing to reach the constitutional issue. Id. at 883.
191. Id. at 863-64. Justice Blackmun did not join in this section of the plurality opin-
ion. Id. at 863-69.
192. Id. at 864-65 (Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, J.J.); id at 876 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[]t is beyond dispute that schools and
school boards must operate within the confines of the First Amendment.-).
193. Id. at 867-68.
194. Id. at 868 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 869 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp
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was voluntary and the choice of books wholly optional, the three
Justices determined that the school board could not claim absolute
discretion over the school library, as it could over compulsory
matters such as the curriculum."9
The plurality,198 however, did not totally divest the school
board of discretion of choosing books for the library. For instance,
no constitutional violation would have occurred if books were
removed because the board found the books to be "pervasively
vulgar."'s' The "official suppression of ideas," however, could
not be constitutionally tolerated.2" If the board intended "to deny
[the students] access to ideas with which [the board] dis-
agreed, ... then [the board had] exercised [its] discretion in viola-
tion of the Constitution."20' The plurality found that granting
summary judgment was improper because there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the school board's motivation
for removing the books was constitutionally permissible.2'
Pico and Tinker lead to the conclusion that the First Amend-
ment protection afforded speech applies to high school students.
These cases also make it clear, however, that this right is limited
by virtue of the special requirements of discipline and order needed
within the educational environment.2 °3 Thus, it is necessary to
determine the extent to which students' constitutional rights may be
limited to preserve the schools' ability to maintain order. Two
cases are particularly helpful in shedding some light on this issue:
Bethel School District v. Fraser2 4 and Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier.°5
In Fraser, a high school student brought suit after being sus-
pended from school for three days because of the content of a
speech he delivered to a student assembly.2 'e The speech, nomi-
nating a fellow student for a student government office, described
the candidate "in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
703, 715 (Mass. 1978)).
197. Id.
198. Justice Blackmun joined this portion of Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 869-75.
199. Id. at 871.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 872.
203. See id. at 863-66; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 512-13 (1969).
204. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
205. 484 U.S. 260 (1987).
206. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-79.
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metaphor."20 7 The Supreme Court did not find a constitutional
violation in 'the school's prohibition of such speech.208
The Court distinguished between the nondisruptive, political
nature of the message conveyed by the wearing of the black
armbands in Tinker and the sexual nature of Fraser's speech, which
was clearly disruptive and offensive to other students.2" A pri-
mary function of the educational system is to inculcate "habits and
manners of civility" which are fundamental to the process of dem-
ocratic self-governance.210 While such values "include tolerance
of divergent political and religious views, even when the views ex-
pressed may be unpopular.., these values must also take into
account consideration of the sensibilities of others."211 Thus, a
student's right to use offensive speech in a public school setting is
not necessarily equivalent to an adult's right to use such speech in
public.2 12 Furthermore, the otherwise constitutionally protected in-
terest of a speaker may be limited where the speech is sexually ex-
plicit and the audience includes children.213
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier1 4 the Court con-
sidered whether the First Amendment rights of high school students
were violated when school officials deleted two pages of articles
from the school newspaper. The newspaper was compiled by the
Journalism II class and was published approximately once every
three weeks.21 5 The pages were deleted because they contained
two stories that the school principal found objectionable: one relat-
ing the experiences of three students during pregnancy; and the
other discussing the impact of divorce on specific students at the
school. 1 6 The Court of Appeals found that the newspaper was a
207. Id.
208. Id. at 685.
209. Id. at 680-81, 683.
210. Id. at 681.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 682. In distinguishing between limitations that are appropriate when applied
to student speech but inappropriate when applied to adult speech, the Court referred ex-
clusively to speech that is in some manner lewd or offensive: "offensive form of expres-
sion"; "Cohen's jacket" (referring to the jacket at issue in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 16 (1971), which said "Fuck the Draft" on its back); "vulgar and offensive terms";
"terms of debate highly offensive"; "[inappropriate] manner of speech"; "lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682-83.
213. Id. at 684.
214. 484 U.S. 260 (1987).
215. Id. at 262.
216. Id. at 263-64. The entire two pages, rather than just the two offending stories, had
to be eliminated because by the time the principal examined the page proofs it was too
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public forum, 17 but the Supreme Court disagreed, holding the
school's action constitutionally permissible.21
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that student speech is entitled to
constitutional protection, but noted that the extent of such protec-
tion may be limited to further the public school's basic educational
mission.2"9 The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the newspaper was a public forum since such a
forum could only be created when the "school authorities [had] :by
policy or by practice' opened [school] facilities 'for indiscriminate
use by the general public,' or by some segment of the public, such
as student organizations."" 0
The newspaper had always been under the close supervision of
the journalism teacher and operated according to specific criteria
established by school board policy and the curriculum guide."
Furthermore, the students in the Journalism H" class were graded
and received academic credit for their participation in the produc-
tion of the newspaper.' Therefore, in the face of this evidence,
the Court found that the school did not intend to create a public
forum, but instead, intended to provide "a supervised learning
experience for journalism students."'2
Thus, the question was not, as in Tinker, whether the school
must tolerate particular student speech but "whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular
student speech" in the context of a school sponsored activity that is
part of the curriculum. 4 The Court concluded that the school is
entitled "to set higlh standards for the student speech that is dis-
seminated under its auspices ... and may refuse to disseminate
student speech that does not meet those standards."'
late to make the necessary changes and get the paper out before the end of the school
year. Id.
217. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
484 U.S. 260 (1987). After finding that the school newspaper was a public forum, the
Court of Appeals held that the newspaper could be censored upon a showing that the
articles would have invaded the rights of others or been seriously disruptive. Id. at 1374.
218. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 276.
219. Id. at 266-67.
220. Id. at 267 (citation omitted) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
221. Id. at 268.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 270.
224. Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 271-72.
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Overall, Tinker, Pico, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier illustrate the
attitude of the Supreme Court regarding the free speech rights of
high school students. Tinker stated that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,2 6 and Pico, Fraser and Kuhlmeier reiterated
this sentiment.227 These four cases, however, also caution that a
student's right to express his or her views within the school envi-
ronment is limited to the extent that such expression disrupts or
interferes with the school's basic educational objective.'
KuhImeier and Fraser are examples of student speech that is
sufficiently disruptive to legitimate educational purposes to warrant
intrusion into the students' generally protected right to free
speech.229 The Fraser Court permitted such an intrusion when the
speech offends the sensibilities of others because it was "offensive-
ly lewd and indecent. "as° The Court repeatedly referred to speech
that is sexually graphic or otherwise lewd or indecent.231 At the
same time, the Fraser opinion expressly acknowledged the "un-
doubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms" and the important role of the schools in
teaching the fundamental value of "tolerance of divergent political
and religious views."232 In Kuhlmeier, the Court allowed the
school to exercise control over student speech that dealt with con-
troversial subjects, rather than just those which are sexually orient-
ed, emphasizing that such control must be exercised in the context
of a school-sponsored activity.233 The Court concluded that when
the student speech at issue is related to a school-sponsored activity,
the Tinker standard does not apply.2
34
226. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
227. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266; Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986);
Pico v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982).
228. See Kuhlneier, 484 U.S. at 266-67; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682-83; Pico, 457 U.S. at
863-64; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
229. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
230. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
231. Id. at 680-83. See also supra note 212.
232. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added).
233. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-72 (indicating areas in which educators are entitled
to exercise greater control: "school-sponsored publications . . . that ...might reasonably
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school"; "activities that are part of the
school curriculum"; "student speech that is disseminated under [the school's] auspices";
and refusal "to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate
drug or alcohol use [or] irresponsible sex").
234. Id. at 272-73.
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2. Student Religious Speech Is Constitutionally Protected
The issue of free speech rights for student religious groups
seeking equal. access to a school's forum should be controlled by
the standard enunciated by the Court in 7nker and Pico, rather
than that in Fraser and Kuhimeier. TInker does not permit sup-
pression of student speech, even if that speech expresses an unpop-
ular or controversial viewpoint, unless there is evidence that the
speech tends to "materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."'35 The EAA essentially adopts this standard, requiring
that "meeting[s do] not materially and substantially interfere with
the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school." 6
Furthermore, guidelines prepared jointly by supporters and oppo-
nents of the EAA and incorporated into the Congressional Record
also addressed the issue of local control, stating that "[t]he Act
does not limit the authority of the school to nfaintain order and
discipline or to protect the well-being of students and faculty.",2
7
Thus, student speech that is disruptive or interferes with the
school's educational mission falls outside of both the scope of the
Act and the constitutional protection afforded by Tinker.
Fraser may place additional limitations on a student group's
claim of entitlement to constitutional protection of its speech. Un-
der Fraser, a group requesting access to the school's forum to
engage in speech that is sexually explicit, lewd, or otherwise inde-
cent may be refused if the speech is "wholly inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education."28 A school re-
quirement that meetings may not contain such speech is essentially
a "manner' restriction, which is not prohibited by the Act. 9
235. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
236. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 40,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2386 (discussing the nearly identical provision con-
tained in an earlier version of the Act and noting that the language mirrors that of 7Tn-
ker).
237. 130 CONG. REC. H12270, H12271 (1984) (presentation of Equal Access Guidelines
to Congresz by Rep. Bonker). These guidelines are particularly helpful since a congres-
sional report was not issued for the final version of the EAA.
238. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986). Denial of access
probably would not extend to a group discussing controversial political or social topics
which happen to be sex-related (i.e., abortion, AIDS, homosexuality, etc.) provided that
such discussions were carried on in a nondisruptive manner which comported with "the
habits and manners of civility." Id. at 681.
239. See SEN. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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Thus, while the school cannot control the content of the speech
(i.e., sex-related matters), it can control the order and discipline of
the meeting by requiring that the manner of speaking not be lewd
or obscene.
In KuhImeier, the Court permitted the school to exercise sub-
stantial control over student speech in the school newspaper.2'
This same degree of control would not be applicable to student-
initiated religious groups under the EAA. First, such a group would
never be school-sponsored since the EAA expressly requires ab-
sence of sponsorship.24' Second, as the Supreme Court concluded
in Mergens, providing equal access is not an endorsement of reli-
gious speech, but rather demonstrates neutrality to such speech and
thereby avoids transmitting a hostile message toward religion.242
Therefore, if a school complies with the requirements of the EAA,
Kuhimeier is inapplicable since the student speech at issue is not
school-sponsored. Thus, the school could not restrict the speech at
such meetings beyond that permitted by Tinker and Fraser.
243
The limited open forum which triggers the requirements of the
EAA, like the school library in Pico, is "especially appropriate for
the recognition of the First Amendment rights of students."2
Three justices in Pico recognized the value of the school library as
a place where students "can literally explore the unknown, and
discover areas of interest and thought not covered by the pre-
scribed curriculum."245 Similarly, when a school establishes a
limited open forum within the terms of the EAA, it is allowing
"noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time."246
2385 ("There could be many neutral and impartial time, place, and manner restrictions
placed on the use of school facilities.").
240. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1987).
241. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1)-(2).
242. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality- opinion). The
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, found application of the
"endorsement" test inappropriate, but concluded that "[t]he accommodation of religion
mandated by the Act is a neutral one." Id. at 260-61. The concurring opinion of Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, found that compliance with the Act was not a per se
endorsement of religion, provided that the school affirmatively disassociated itself from the
religious group's speech. Id. at 269-70.
243. See supra notes 177-85, 206-13 and accompanying text.
244. Pico v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982).
245. Id. at 869 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp.
703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
246. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b).
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The EAA requires that attendance at student meetings be "vol-
untary and student-initiated, 247 which is analogous to the "com-
pletely voluntary" use of the school library in Pico where the
selection of books was "entirely a matter of free choice."248 By
granting students nondiscriminatory access to the forum to engage
in religious or other speech, the school is permitting the same
exploration of new ideas and independent thinking that was found
to be of such vital importance in Pico.
Examination of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
free speech rights of high school students has revealed that a stu-
dent-initiated religious group which falls within the terms of the
EAA is protected from discriminatory treatment by school officials.
Such treatment is demanded not only by the EAA, but also by the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Indeed, several lower
courts which have considered equal access and freedom of speech
claims have acknowledged that students' First Amendment rights
were implicated, but have found that the Establishment Clause
outweighed the students' other constitutional rights.249 When the
Supreme Court concluded in Mergens, however, that equal access
does not violate Establishment Clause principles,' it established
that the Establishment Clause does not provide a justification for
disallowing student religious groups to meet in a school's fo-
rum.25
Those lower courts which have held otherwise distinguished
Widmar v. Vincent, which explicitly concluded that the Establish-
ment Clause did not provide the "compelling state interest" re-
quired to justify the school's content-based discrimination against
the otherwise protected religious speech of students.252 These
courts distinguished the college students in Widmar from younger
students, relying on a footnote in Widmar which stated: "University
students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable
247. Id § 4071(c)(1).
248. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869.
249. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1400-01, 1407 (10th
Cir. 1985); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 559 (3d Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d
971, 980 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
250. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990). See also supra, part II.C
(discussing Mergens in detail).
251. This assumes, of course, that the EAA's requirements of voluntariness, non-sponsor-
ship, and noninterference with the orderly conduct of educational activities have been met.
252. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71, 276 (1981).
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than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." 2 3
This distinction between high school and college students is
relevant to the determination of whether equal access either ad-
vances or inhibits religion, which is the second prong of the Lem-
on test?2 4 If the students perceive the school's policy as one of
favoritism, rather than neutrality, toward religion, then religion is
impermissibly "advanced" in violation of the Establishment Clause.
For example, the Court of Appeals in Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Distric25 5 found that the difference in maturity and im-
pressionability between a high school student and a college student
justified the conclusion that younger students would be less able to
understand that equal access signified government neutrality, rather
than favoritism, toward religion. 6 Similarly, the court in Lub-
bock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dis-
trict2"7 pointed to the age and impressionability of the students to
support its conclusion that the school's equal access policy created
the impermissible perception of state endorsement of religion. 8
The same distinction was relied on by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Garnett v. Renton School District.259 The decision was
later vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for consideration
in light of Mergens.2'
The Mergens decision and the legislative history of the EAA,
however, indicate that this distinction, based on the age of the
students, is unwarranted. The plurality in Mergens rejected the
argument that age difference justifies a different resolution of the
Establishment Clause issue:
We think that secondary school students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse
or support student speech that it merely permits on a non-
discriminatory basis. The proposition that schools do not
endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.
253. Id. at 274 n.14.
254. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the elements of the Lemon
test).
255. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
256. IM at 552.
257. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. depied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
258. Id at 1045-46.
259. 874 F.2d 608, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 496 U.S. 914 (1990).
260. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 914 (1990).
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"[P]articularly in this age of massive media informa-
tion... the few years difference in age between high
school and college students [does not] justif[y] departing
from Widmar."26
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion concluded that no Establish-
ment Clause violation exists when the school takes steps to avoid
the appearance of endorsing the goals of the religious groups. 62
He concluded that it is "the school's behavior, not the purported
immaturity of high school students, [which] is dispositive."2 63 Six
justices in Mergens found that the difference in the age and matu-
rity levels of high school and college students was irrelevant to the
determination of whether granting equal access to religious groups
would be perceived as an endorsement.26"
The congressional supporters of the EAA were aware of the
perception that elementary and high school students were incapable
of separating state neutrality from state sponsorship of religion.265
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, however, based on psycho-
logical evidence and direct testimony from seven students, found
that "students below the college level are capable of distinguishing
between State-initiated, school-sponsored, or teacher-led religious
speech on the one hand and student-initiated, student-led religious
speech on the other."2" The Committee also determined that de-
nial of equal access created a reasonable perception by the students
261. Id. at 250 (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Bender v.
'Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 556 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
262. Id. at 262-63. Justice Marshall pointed to the University of Missouri in Widmar v.
Vincent as an example of a school taking the proper measures to avoid the appearance of
endorsing religious activities. Id. at 266-67. Justice Marshall noted that the University's
forum included many more groups than did the high school at issue in Mergens, includ-
ing politically-oriented groups, and that the University's student handbook specifically
disclaimed any identification with or endorsement of the goals of any student group. Id.
263. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
264. See id. at 229, 250 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.1.,
and White and Blackmun, J.J.); id. at 262, 267 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., concurring in
the judgment). The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, reject-
ed the "endorsement" test and adopted a test which asked instead whether the school
impermissibly coerced a student into participating in religious activity. Id. at 260-61.
while conceding that "[t]he inquiry with respect to coercion . . . must be undertaken with
sensitivity to the special circumstances that exist in a secondary school," Justice Kennedy
found that coercion does not necessarily result from compliance with the EAA. Id. at
261-62.
265. SEN. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 9, 34, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2355, 2384.
266. Id. at 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2381.
10531993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of state hostility toward religion.267 The Committee, therefore,
concluded that denial of equal access rested on false assumptions
contrary to its f'mdings. 26 As the Committee noted, what is im-
portant with respect to Establishment Clause concerns is that there
be no reasonable perception of state sponsorship of religious
269activity. While the Committee recognized that equal access
may in some sense advance religion, such "advancement...
would come from the students themselves and this the Establish-
ment Clause does not bar."27 The report of the House Commit-
tee on Education and Labor on the EAA similarly rejected the
notion that students below the college level are unable to distin-
guish state neutrality from favoritism.27'
Once this unfounded distinction between college and high
school students is removed, there is nothing that justifies a result
on the issue of equal access in high schools different from that
reached in Widmar.272 Even if the EAA had not been enacted,
students still have free speech rights that are entitled to constitu-
tional protection.273 There are no countervailing Establishment
Clause concerns that could provide the compelling state interest re-
quired to justify a content-based exclusion of student speech from
a forum generally open for such speech. Thus, while a high school
need not favor religion by providing a forum for religious activity
and discussion, once it has chosen to open a forum for student-
initiated speech it cannot exclude religious speech from that forum
without violating the First Amendment of the Constitution.
267. Id. at 36, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2382.
268. Id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2355-56.
269. Id. at 35-36, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2381-82.
270. Id. at 34, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2380.
271. See H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 3-5; Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith:
Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 757
(1986) ("[S]uch a protective attitude toward secondary school students is inconsistent with
the premise that students possess rational and autonomous intellects, enabling them to ab-
sorb and select among differing points of view."); Arp, supra note 79, at 157
("[Clourts . . . should acknowledge that the distinction between high school students and
college students is not as dramatic as formerly construed.").
272. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (holding that a University could
not refuse to allow a student religious group to use University facilities because the
group's activities were "forms of speech and association protected by the First Amend-
ment.").
273. See supra part IV.A.1.
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B. Preemption by the EAA
The Federal Constitution requires that the EAA prevail over a
conflicting state constitution because the Federal Act preempts state
law. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution,
Congress has the power to override or preempt contrary state law
in any area in which it has the constitutional power to legis-
late.274  In Garnett v. Renton School District,275  Judge
McGovern found neither explicit nor implied congressional intent
in the EAA to preempt contrary state constitutional law.276 In
fact, Judge McGovern's opinion construes language contained in
the Act as explicitly permitting states to supersede the mandates of
the federal law if, under state law, equal access would be prohibit-
ed.2" Upon closer examination, however, Judge McGovern's in-
terpretation of the Act's language is unpersuasive because it com-
pletely fails to recognize clearly inferable congressional intent to
preempt contrary state law.
1. The Language of the Act
Judge McGovern correctly stated that the EAA did not contain
express language indicating a congressional intent to preempt state
law.27s McGovern's opinion, however, also stated that
[t]he plain language of the Act is clear that Congress did
274. U.S. CONST. art. V1I, cl. 2. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) ("It is well-established that within
constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms.
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether
may be found from a [pervasive] 'scheme of federal regulation' . . ...) (citation omitted)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
275. 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
276. Id. at 537-38. See also supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text (discussing in
detail Judge McGovern's analysis of whether Congress intended for the EAA to preempt
state constitutional law).
277. See Garnett, 772 F. Supp. at 537 (stating that the EAA was not to be construed
to sanction otherwise unlawful activities or to abridge constitutional rights); supra notes
138-39 and accompanying text. Although the Garnett court's reasoning is based on the
Washington State Constitution, nothing in the opinion precludes application of this reason-
ing to a state statute. Thus, if Judge McGovern interpreted the operative language of the
Act correctly, it would seem to permit any state, regardless of its constitutional provisions,
to pass legislation effectively exempting that state from the mandates of the EAA.
278. Garnett, 772 F. Supp. at 537. It is not surprising that express language of preemp-
tion is not found in the Act. Relatively few cases raising the preemption question turn on
such explicit language; thus, it is usually necessary to discern or infer congressional intent
to preempt state law. KENNETH STARR ET AL, THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF
THE APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE, AMEPICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 14-15 (1991).
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not legislate so comprehensively as to occupy an entire
field of regulation:
Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to authorize
the United States or any State or political subdivision
thereof -
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
[or]
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any per-
son.
2 7 9
Judge McGovern interpreted these clauses to exempt from the EAA
any state having a strict constitutional prohibition on public support
of religion or religious influence in public schools."' This con-
clusion, however, does not withstand an examination of the inten-
tions and motivations of the drafters of the EAA.
The legislative history of the EAA provides persuasive evi-
dence of what these clauses of the Act were intended not to do.
The debates on the floor of Congress and the congressional reports
indicate that the drafters and virtually all of the EAA's supporters
believed that it was necessary to "clarify and confirm the First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association,
and free exercise of religion which accrue to public school
students."28 This need for clarity resulted primarily from several
conflicting lower court decisions which left school administrators
confused regarding the ability of students to engage in religious
speech.282 In other words, the drafters and most supporters of the
Act did not feel that the EAA was necessary to confer the right to
equal access upon high school students; they believed that the right
already existed and was protected by the First Amendment.283
It is clear that if equal access is required by the First
Amendment's Free Speech, Free Association, and Free Exercise
Clauses, Congress cannot pass a law exempting states from an
equal access requirement for any reason, including a conflicting
279. Garnet, 772 F. Supp at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)
(1988)).
280. See id. (stating that the EAA should not be interpreted to condone otherwise un-
lawful activities or abridge constitutional rights); supra notes 138-39 and accompanying
text.
281. S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2349.
282. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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state constitutional provision. The Supremacy Clause clearly states
that "[the federal] Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding." 284 Although Congress has the
power to excuse a state from a congressional directive, it does not
have that same power with respect to a constitutional impera-
tive.285 If equal access is constitutionally required,2' the two
clauses in the EAA upon which Judge McGovern relies to allow
the Washington State Constitution to supersede the Act's require-
ments cannot be interpreted in this manner and remain consistent
with the Federal Constitution. Thus, regardless of whether equal
access is in fact constitutionally required, the drafters of the EAA
could not possibly have intended that this language be given the
meaning which Judge McGovern ascribes to it. The drafters be-
lieved that the EAA merely codified a constitutional impera-
tive.2"' They could not have intended the Act to permit a state
constitution to override the Act's requirements, since to do so
would allow a state constitution to supersede what they believed
was a federal constitutional requirement, in violation of the Su-
premacy Clause.
Since these two clauses of the EAA should not be given the
284. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
285. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1981)
(noting that while Congress has broad powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to grant
to individuals equality of civil rights and equal protection of the laws against State inter-
vention, "neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (indicating
that while the Constitution grants Congress specific power to legislate in certain areas,
"these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised
in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "those who have framed written constitu-
tions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void").
286. There are differing views on whether equal access is mandated by the constitution.
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 1, at 35 (arguing that if a school has an open forum, then
equal access for student religious groups is constitutionally required); Lupu, supra note
271, at 755-78 (noting that under some circumstances, free speech concerns may outweigh
establishment clause concerns and, thus, make equal access constitutionally required);
Nadine Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student Religious
Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and State?,
71 CORNELL L. REv. 143, 157-58 (1985) (claiming that an absolute rule either granting
or denying equal access to student religious groups is constitutionally unworkable and
arguing instead that equal access disputes must be settled on a case-by-case basis); supra
part IV.A.
287. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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effect which Judge McGovern gave them it must be determined
precisely what they are intended to mean. Unfortunately, the House
and Senate reports provide little assistance because, at the time
these reports were written, the Act did not yet contain these claus-
es in their final forms.288 The "Equal Access Guidelines," howev-
er, written after the Act's passage and included in the Congression-
al Record,289 do provide some insight into the ultimate inclusion
of these two clauses. Specifically, the guidelines twice make refer-
ence to the "otherwise unlawful" clause (Section 4071(d)(5) of the
Act).290
The first such reference states that while the Act prohibits a
denial of equal access to groups wishing to discuss controversial
topics, a school nevertheless "must not sanction meetings in which
unlawful conduct occurs., 291 The second reference addresses the
possibility of hate groups being granted access to the school forum
under the Act and states that "[s]tudent groups which are unlaw-
ful . . . can be excluded."2" These references do not suggest that
the exclusion of otherwise unlawful meetings from the Act's pro-
tection was intended to allow school officials to exclude student
religious groups from the forum. Instead, the guidelines specifically
state that content-based exclusions of student groups may not be
tolerated.293 The guidelines also note, however, that neither will
unlawful conduct within the meetings themselves be tolerated.294
Thus, it is not the nature of the group itself which permits its
exclusion from the forum, but the nature of the group's activities
and the manner in which its meetings are conducted.
This interpretation of the language follows from the debates
which took place in both houses of Congress. Several legislators
expressed concern regarding the possible protection that the EAA
288. See H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 46, at 9-10 (considering a version of the Act
which did not contain any language comparable to the "otherwise unlawful" or "uncon-
stitutional" clauses); S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 36-41, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2382-87 (considering a version of the EAA which contained in § 3(4)
language similar to the "otherwise unlawful" clause but did not contain language compara-
ble to the "unconstitutional clause-).
289. 130 CONG. REc. H12,270 (1984).
290. Id. at H12,272.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. ("Students who wish to discuss controversial social and legal issues . . . may
not be barred on the basis of the content of their speech.").
294. Id.
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may afford to groups which advocate or participate in violent or
unlawful conduct.295 Since, the Act explicitly denies protection to
groups which intend to engage in illegal activities, however, it
insures that public schools will not be used for the recruitment
efforts of such groups.
The unconstitutionality clause can be interpreted in a similar
manner. This clause states that the Act does not permit government
action which would "abridge the constitutional rights of any per-
son."29 Such a violation of constitutional rights may occur be-
cause of the manner in which meetings are conducted. For exam-
ple, concern was expressed during a Senate debate that the EAA
might permit school officials to discriminate against students who
choose not to participate in religious meetings permitted under the
Act or that the meetings permitted by the Act may go beyond
religious discussion and amount to actual religious services within
the school.297 Such actions would be beyond the reach of the
Act's protections and violate the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.
2. Implied Congressional Intent
While the Garnett opinion acknowledged that congressional
intent to preempt state law may be inferred, 298 Judge McGovern
concluded that the Act did not reveal an "intent to displace the
Washington [state] constitution."2  This conclusion does not
withstand closer scrutiny of the congressional intent behind the
EAA and its practical effect.
Congressional intent to preempt state law may be inferred when
Congress has legislated so pervasively on a matter that it has "oc-
cupied the field." Preemption also occurs when the state law stands
295. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S8343 (1984) (statements of Sen. Gorton noting that the
EAA could potentially protect a Ku Klux Klan meeting); id. at H3858 (statements of Rep.
Mitchell expressing concern that the EAA could protect meetings held by hate groups and
satanic cults); id. at H3861 (statements of Rep. Ackerman suggesting that hate groups,
satanic worshipers, and those practicing animal sacrifice could claim protection under the
EAA).
296. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(7) (1988).
297. 130 CONG. REC. S8360 (statements of Sen. Weicker).
298. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531, 537 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (stating
that courts infer [congressional intent to preempt state law] where Congress has legislated
comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation . . . or where the state law at
issue conflicts with federal law ... ." (quoting Northwest Central Pipeline v. Kansas
Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989)).
299. Id. at 538.
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as an "obstacle" to the fulfillment of congressional goals.3" The
basic principles of the preemption doctrine are summarized in Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Commission:
30 1
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to
supersede state law altogether may be found from a
"'scheme of federal regulation . . .so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it,' because 'the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject,' or because
'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose."' Even where Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law. Such a conflict arises ... where state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."3"
In order to determine whether Congress has occupied a field, a
court must examine the federal interest that will be furthered by
the legislation. The EAA concerns an area where there is a domi-
nant federal interest. The stated purpose of the bill is to protect
student rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association and
free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.30 3 The protection of rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution is a substantial federal interest. Enactment of
the EAA was deemed necessary because students were being de-
nied their constitutional rights.3 04 As recognized by the federal
300. See STARR ET AL., supra note 279, at 18-30.
301. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
302. Id. at 203-04 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fidelity Savings &
Loan As'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) and Hines v. Davido*itz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
While the Garnett opinion quotes a portion of this statement, as it appeared in Northwest
Central Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 537, the statement in Pacific Gas & Electric is a more
complete description of the factors to be considered under this test for preemption. The
language found in both Pacific Gas & Electric and Northwest Central Pipeline originated
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
303. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 46-53, 60-63 and accompanying text.
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district court in Hoppock v. Twin Falls School District,305 "the
Supreme Court has consistently limited local control over the
schools when the First Amendment is at issue."306
Congressional intent to preempt state law is also found where
federal and state laws conflict since the "state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. ' ' 307 This "obstacle preemption" test
is the most persuasive argument for inferring that Congress in-
tended to preempt contrary state constitutional law when it enacted
the EAA. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mar-
keting and Bargaining Board' is an example of such obstacle
preemption. In this case, the laws in question were the federal
Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 ("AFPA") and the State of
Michigan's Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act ("Michigan
Act"). 31 The AFPA was enacted to equalize the bargaining posi-
tions of producers and processors of agricultural products.3" The
Act protected the right of producers to choose to sell their products
themselves or to sell through a cooperative association, and specifi-
cally forbade the associations from coercing any producer into
joining an association.311 The Michigan Act also was designed to
facilitate and protect producers' collective action.32 The Michigan
Act went further than the AFPA, providing for state accreditation
as the exclusive bargaining agent of a producers' association which
was comprised of more than 50% of the state's producers of a
particular commodity and whose production accounted for more
than 50% of the state's total production of that commodity.1 3
Once accredited, all producers of the commodity were bound by
the association's contracts.314 The Supreme Court held that the
Michigan Act was preempted by the AFPA because it stood "'as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress."'315 The .Court reached this
305. 772 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Idaho 1991).
306. Id at 1163.
307. Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
308. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
309. Id. at 463.
310. Id. at 464.
311. Id. at 464-65.
312. Id. at 466.
313. Id. at 466.
314. Id. at 466-68.
315. Id. at 478 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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conclusion notwithstanding language in the AFPA which stated that
it "'shall not be construed to change or modify existing State
law.' 3
16
The Court looked to both the language and the legislative
history of the AFPA to determine the Act's intended goals.
3 17
The language of the Act indicated that its purpose was to protect
the right of producers to voluntarily join cooperative organizations
and to insure that processors would not coerce the producers into
joining such organizations. 318 The AFPA's legislative history also
evidenced a desire to protect producers from coercive influences
exerted by processors or other producers. 319 Given this goal, the
Court found that the Michigan Act conflicted with the AFPA since
it permitted the formation of associations which had the power to
coerce producers into selling their products according to the terms
dictated by the association. 321 Thus, while the AFPA did not ex-
plicitly prohibit a state from requiring exclusive representation of
producers, the Michigan Act nevertheless conflicted with the feder-
al law because it "empower[ed] producers' associations to do pre-
cisely what the federal Act [forbade] them to do."321
Like the Michigan Act, Washington's constitution permits pre-
cisely what the EAA forbids, thereby frustrating accomplishment of
the federal law's goals. These goals are clearly stated in both the
language and the legislative history of the EAA. The first section
of the Act provides that a school may not "deny equal access or a
fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students . . . on the
basis of the religious, political, philosophical or other content of
[their] speech at such meetings.' '3' The legislative history evi-
316. Id. at 469 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2305(d) (1982)).
317. Id. at 470-77.
318. Id. at 470-71. The Court looked specifically to two sections of the AFPA. First, §
2301 reported a finding that "the marketing and bargaining position of individual farmers
will be adversely affected unless they are free to join together voluntarily in cooperative
organizations." Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (1982)). Second, § 2303 made it unlawful to
coerce a producer "in the exercise of his right . . . to refrain from joining or belonging
to an association of producers . . . ." Id. at 471 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1982)).
319. Id. at 471-77. The Court examined congressional hearing transcripts, amendments to
and revisions of the original bill, as well as Senate and House reports. It was clear from
this history that the final version of the AFPA was specifically intended to protect not
only the producer's right to join a cooperative organization, but also the producer's right
not to do so.
320. Id. at 477.
321. Id. at 477-78.
322. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
1062 [Vol. 43:1021
THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT
dences Congress' intent to protect students' First Amendment right
to engage in controversial speech within the public school.3' If a
state constitution permitted the state to exempt itself from the
requirements of the EAA, the very purpose of the EAA would be
severely undermined. Many state constitutions, similar to those of
Washington and Idaho, contain specific prohibitions against state
aid to religion and, thus, require a stricter separation of church and
state than does the federal Establishment Clause.32 If these state
constitutional provisions exempt the states from the EAA's require-
ments, Congress' intent to prevent discrimination by public schools
against religious speech and to eliminate the perception of state
hostility toward such speech3" will be wholly frustrated. The
EAA would not have been necessary if Congress believed that the
right of students to engage in such speech was being adequately
protected by the states. The need for such legislation arose precise-
ly because school officials were prohibiting religious speech by
student groups.3 26
Furthermore, if the "unconstitutional" clause of the EAA327 is
interpreted to exempt states with strict state establishment prohibi-
tions, then presumably the "otherwise unlawful" clause of the
Act328 would apply with equal force to states with legislative enact-
ments prohibiting equal access. Thus, any state which wanted to
avoid granting equal access to student religious groups could sim-
ply pass a law prohibiting religious meetings on school property. In
323. See supra part II.B.
324. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Religion under State Constitutions, 496 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL & SOC. SC. 65, 69 (1988) ("Most state constitutions ... seek to maintain a
separation of church and state in the realm of education, in part . . .by preventing (the
diversion of public funds] to sectarian institutions or purposes, and in part by banning re-
ligious practices in schools receiving state funds."); DONALD E. BoLES, THE BIBLE, RELI-
GION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 43 (1965) ("[A]l1 states but Vermont have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the expenditure of public funds, or at least school funds for sectari-
an purposes.").
325. See S. REP. No. 357, supra note 44, at 14-21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2360-67 (discussing the need for legislation to protect students First Amendment rights
and eliminate the perception of state hostility toward religion).
326. See id. at 11-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2357-60 (citing examples of
school prohibition of student religious speech and discussing the need for legislation to
rectify the situation).
327. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(7) (1988) (stating that nothing in the Act shall permit the
government to "abridge the constitutional rights of any person").
328. See i. § 4071(d)(5) (stating that the Act shall -not permit the government to
"sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful").
10631993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
theory, all states that denied equal access prior to the passage of
the EAA could continue to do so; if not by state constitutional
provision then by state legislative enactment. It is difficult to be-
lieve that Congress would pass a law basically telling the states
that "this is what you are required to do ... unless you would
rather not." That is precisely the position, however, to which the
EAA would be relegated if Judge McGovern's interpretation of the
statute is adopted. The EAA would, in essence, become a nullity.
The best long-term solution for resolving the dispute over the
EAA's application in light of a conflicting state constitution is an
amendment to the Act, which makes clear. Congress' intent to
preempt state law. Although the intent to preempt can be im-
plied,329 an express declaration of such intent would leave no
doubt as to the operation of the Act and allow courts to avoid the
appearance of legislating. This result is particularly important in a
federalist system which requires "an especially clear statement of
congressional intent to oust states from their traditional legislative
functions." 31 Institutional concerns regarding the appropriate allo-
cation of responsibilities between the legislative and judicial
branches demand that legislative intent to preempt state law be
apparent.331 Thus, the danger of having the judiciary substitute its
own judgment for that of the democratically elected and politically
accountable legislature is avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
The EAA was passed to ensure that students be afforded their
constitutional right to engage in religious speech on equal terms
with other student speech.332 A denial of equal access denies stu-
dents rights which are protected, not only by the EAA, but by the
First Amendment itself.333 If state statutes or state constitutional
provisions are permitted to override the requirements of the EAA,
the Act essentially becomes meaningless.3 4 Such an intent cannot
logically be ascribed to Congress. An amendment to the Act would
329. See supra part IV.B.2 (discussing in detail how congressional intent to preempt
state law can be inferred).
330. STARR ET AL., supra note 279, at 40.
331. Id. at 47.
332. See supra note 61-63 and accompanying text.
333. See supra part IV.A.
334. See supra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
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resolve any confusion regarding the Act's preemptive effect, pre-
venting both the frustration of congressional goals and the denial
of constitutional rights.
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